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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
The challenge
1. The criminal acts committed in New York and Washington on 11 September have severely
shaken the international community and shown how sensitive societies based on freedom
of movement and trade were to the acts of terrorists who use this freedom to try to destroy
them. If there is any one human activity which is one of the symbols of these freedoms, it
is air transport and so it is not surprising that it is one of the priority targets of these blind,
inhuman acts. The media coverage of any accident involving this means of transport also
helps to give terrorists the platform they seek to weaken our societies and to undermine the
confidence on which these societies are founded. The aviation community must therefore
respond in an exemplary manner to the threat which it is again facing it in order to restore
public confidence and to help keep businesses operating.
2. This is the background to the decision, taken the day after the attacks by the Heads of State
and Government, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the
Commission and the High Representative responsible for the common foreign and security
policy, that the European Union must take urgent decisions to respond to the new
challenges facing it. For its part, the Council of the European Union, which met the same
day, asked
1 the Ministers of Transport to evaluate the measures taken to ensure air
transport security and any additional measures which should be taken.
3. On 14 September, the Council, at a special meeting of the Transport Ministers, adopted
conclusions
2 in which it considers it is necessary, inter alia, to implement fully the
essential measures to prevent unlawful acts against civil aviation contained in
Document 30 of the European Civil Aviation Conference.
4. Lastly, the European Council, meeting in extraordinary session on 21 September, called
upon “the Transport Council to take the necessary measures to strengthen air transport
security at its next meeting on 15 October. These measures will cover in particular:
- classification of weapons;
- technical training for crews;
- checking and monitoring of hold luggage;
- protection of cockpit access;
- quality control of security measures applied by Member States.
Effective and uniform application of air security measures will be ensured in particular by
a peer review to be introduced in the very near future.”
An effective Community response
5. The Member States have been able to react in an appropriate manner to the waves of
terrorism in the 70s and 80s up until the present time through cooperation within the
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International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC). While passenger numbers increased four-fold and flight numbers
doubled between 1970 and 1999, the number of acts affecting the security of air transport
fell from 100 to 6 and the number of victims from 92 to 0.
6. The size of the threat was often also linked to the nationality of an airline and the place of
departure or arrival of a flight, so it made more sense for preventive action to be taken on a
case-by-case basis according to the threat and the situation lent itself less to common
action.
7. The Community has therefore only been indirectly concerned with security through the
Commission's legislative proposals on crew training (proposal for a Directive on safety
requirements for cabin crews,
3 proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 3922/91 to
lay down common rules in the field of commercial operations by aircraft
4) and the
reporting of occurrences in civil aviation (proposal for a Directive on occurrence reporting
in civil aviation
5).
8. Recent events have shown that the situation has changed radically and that we are now all
faced with the same threat in the Community since any aircraft can be hijacked on
departure from an airport and used as a bomb against any city within its flying range. We
are therefore all affected by the preventive measures taken in airports and these can no
longer be left solely to the local authorities or even the national authorities responsible for
an airport.
9. Awareness of this interdependence has come out clearly during discussions in the various
bodies referred to above, leading to the realisation that everyone should now implement
the same measures (those in Document 30), for both international and domestic flights,
and that a collective mechanism should be devised to check that they are being applied
(peer review).
10. Given this situation, the Commission believes the best way to achieve these objectives is
to use the resources at the Community’s disposal which have proven their value in a large
number of other sectors.
11. The problem is the same as that of air safety and the same solutions could be adopted
since the aim is to guarantee the highest possible uniform level of protection to all our
citizens.
12. To achieve this, it will be sufficient to adopt common standards and to put means of
control in place. Community discipline and the Treaty mechanisms will do the rest.
13. This approach also has several advantages. Thanks to the association agreements between
the Community and various European States (European Economic Area,
Community/Switzerland Agreement, Agreement on the European Civil Aviation Area),
the incorporation of these standards into the Community acquis will extend the same
level of protection to most of the European continent.
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14. Furthermore, the mutual trust created by a collective auditing system in Community
legislation will make it possible to avoid repeating the checks made on passengers,
luggage and cargo in one Community airport when they are in transit through another
Community airport, but without affecting security.
15. Lastly, this will help to reduce the administrative burden on air carriers who will only
have to show to one single Member State that they are applying the measures incumbent
upon them.
16. In view of the urgency of the situation and the need to restore public confidence in air
transport speedily, the Commission has also concluded that, despite the different
responsibilities which Member States have as regards the implementation of security
measures, a Regulation is the best way to adopt common rules and put in place the
mechanisms to monitor their effective, uniform application, not a Directive, which would
take too long to implement. Since this essentially involves adopting and implementing
common standards for aviation security, the legal basis for the adoption of this
Regulation is obviously transport policy and Article 80(2) of the Treaty.
A gradual approach
17. As stated above, there is agreement that the essential measures contained in ECAC
Document  30 should be the basis for Community action: it is therefore proposed
incorporating its provisions into the Community legal order.
18. However, it is accepted that these measures are not detailed enough to enable their
application to be monitored and that, for this purpose, detailed technical implementation
standards need to be adopted, the technical nature of which is not very well suited to a
conventional legal process. The Commission, assisted by a Committee of Representatives
of the Member States, therefore needs to be given the power to adopt the implementing
measures required. For this purpose, it will use the detailed technical specifications which
the ECAC has developed for applying the memorandum of understanding on which it is
currently working.
19. It is also a known fact that, while some of these measures are already applied in the
Member States, such as the surveillance of sensitive areas and the checking of passengers
and luggage, others are applied only very partially, such as the checking of hold luggage
and cargo. It will therefore not be possible to implement all these measures effectively
and uniformly immediately and this will require a realistic, gradual process to take
account of the time which will be needed to recruit and train personnel or alter
infrastructure. The Commission will take this into account when drafting the
implementing measures.
20. Lastly, as the Member State have very different responsibilities as regards the
implementation of security measures, it is essential for each Member State to put in place
a national implementation programme that reflects the structure of its own institutions
and to appoint a competent authority to ensure the necessary cooperation.
21. As requested by the European Council on 21 September 2001, the Community will
therefore give itself the means to ensure civil aviation security through the following
measures:
- control of access to sensitive areas of airports and aircraft;5
- control of passengers and their hand luggage;
- control and monitoring of hold luggage;
- control of cargo and mail;
- training of ground staff;
- definition of specifications for the equipment for the above controls;
- classification of weapons and others items which it is prohibited to bring on to aircraft
or into the sensitive areas of airports.
22. There may be exceptional cases, however, where the common measures are not fully
suitable for dealing with a particular threat on certain flights. The Member States must
therefore be able to take additional measures to deal with such events. As this must not
unduly affect the uniformity recommended by the European Council, this flexibility must
be subject to a Community control mechanism that allows the preventive measures
applicable everywhere to be modified and enables any national variants which are no
longer justified to terminated.
23. As stressed by the Council, the ECAC measures do not, however, take account of any
change in the threat. Additional measures will therefore supplement the common
standards as and when they are developed by the ECAC or any other international bodies
that have started work on devising effective responses to any foreseeable threat.
24. Lastly, an effective system of control is needed which also helps to spread good practice.
Even if it has only been tested on a small scale (only six checks have been made), the
mechanism envisaged by the ECAC and which the Transport Council has asked us to
promote throughout the world (conclusions of the Council of 14 September) constitutes a
good basis for this purpose. The Member States must designate an authority to coordinate
the implementation of the measures and to put in place a quality control system for each
carrier and airfield. These systems will then be audited centrally by multinational teams
of specially trained inspectors whose reports will enable the Member States to make up
for any shortcomings and the Commission, if necessary, to fulfil its responsibilities as
guardian of the Treaty. The Regulation should therefore lay the foundations for such a
system of peer review, as requested by the European Council.
25. According to an initial evaluation in the financial statement attached to this proposal, an
inspection body should be set up within the Commission with its own staff (of four) to
provide back-up and logistical support for inspectors made available by the Member
States from the competent authorities responsible for implementing national quality
controls. These inspectors, in two teams of four, should be able to audit 70 to 80 airports
a year, i.e. 20% of Community airports, enough to assess the implementation of the
security measures and detect any shortcomings. The operating costs of this surveillance
system (staff, training and mission expenses) should be divided between the Member
States and the Community.
26. However, the urgency of the situation, as emphasised by the European Council, calls for
the above control system to be set up  immediately to check that the Member States are
now applying all the measures in ECAC Document 30 in an effective manner, as they say
they are. The Commission has therefore decided to take the measures required for this
purpose in cooperation with the administrations concerned. It will set up a Member6
States' group of experts to work out the arrangements for these inspections and assign the
necessary financial and human resources.
27. While the above measures will enable most of the European Council's requests to be met,
those concerning crew training and cockpit access will require other legal instruments as
they are not concerned with the preventive measures to be taken in airports. As indicated
above, Commission proposals on these points are being examined by the Council and the
European Parliament (see paragraph 8). Furthermore, thought will have to be given to the
security of the telecommunications networks used by the various components of civil
aviation, in particular the most sensitive ones such as air traffic management.
28. Finally, it must be pointed out that the Community can only legislate for the territory for
which it is competent. It therefore cannot impose measures to be taken in third country
airports for flights which land at Community airports or overfly the Member States. It
will therefore be necessary to establish the bilateral or multilateral arrangements
necessary to guarantee civil aviation security throughout the world. Action along these
lines has already been taken by the ICAO at its last Assembly. The Community and the
Member States, in agreement with the other European States which are members of the
ICAO, have proposed that the standards laid down in Annex 17 to the Chicago
Convention should be strengthened and that the ICAO should be given the powers to
enable it to monitor their effective implementation, drawing on the work carried out
along these lines in Europe. The Commission will propose the measures required to
continue this action at all the necessary levels.
29. Without prejudice to the measures described here above, the development of future
technologies would need to be pursued to allow for better prevention, as well as for new
corrective measures to be implemented progressively. Research for technologies for
better airport security equipment and secure aeronautical telecommunication networks, as
well as technologies for airborne systems (e.g. comprehensive aircraft anti collision
system
6) should be initiated. A specific research activity will be included in the Sixth
Framework Programme for RTD to support this. Future systems would have to be
compatible with the growing need for air transportation.
Conclusions
Recent events show that all the Member States are now faced with the same terrorist threat
and must therefore formulate a collective response by effectively and uniformly introducing
common preventive measures based on the world of the ECAC.
This challenge can best be met by making use of the Community’s powers that have already
been proven in many other sectors in which similar problems have arisen and by taking action
on aviation security as recommended by the European Council.
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(Ground Proximity Warning System – to prevent ground collision) and TCAS (Traffic alert and
Collision Avoidance System – to prevent airborne collision) and SMGCS (Surface Movement and
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The Commission therefore asks the European Parliament and the Council to adopt the
attached draft Regulation, which establishes common rules to ensure civil aviation security,
gives the Commission the necessary powers to adopt the implementing measures that will
facilitate their application and establishes a collective control mechanism for this application.
In parallel, the Commission will immediately set up a peer review of the effective and
uniform application of air security measures. It will also propose measures to ensure the
protection of European Union citizens throughout the world by means of appropriate bilateral
or multilateral arrangements.8
2001/0234 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular
Article 80(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission
7,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
8,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions
9,
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty
10,
Whereas:
(1)  The criminal acts committed in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001
show that terrorism is one of the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy and
freedom and the values of peace, which are the very essence of the European Union.
(2)  A high uniform level of protection of the European citizen should at all times be
ensured in civil aviation by preventing acts of unlawful interference.
(3)  Without prejudice to measures to be taken on the basis of title 6 of the Treaty on the
European Union, such objective should be achieved by the adoption of common civil
aviation security rules and by measures ensuring that they are applied effectively and
uniformly in the Community; and executive powers should be delegated to the
Commission to adopt the related detailed implementation measures.
(4)  Common aviation security rules should be fully consistent with the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
(5)  The various types of aviation activities are not subject to the same type of threat; it is
therefore necessary for the detailed implementation measures to be duly adjusted to
the special circumstances of each activity.
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(6)  The Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on
7  December  1944, provides for minimum standards to ensure the security of civil
aviation.
(7)  In view of the diversity of the parties involved in the implementation of security
measures at national level, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a
competent authority responsible for the co-ordination and the monitoring of the
implementation of aviation security programmes.
(8)  Member States shall be given the necessary flexibility to adjust their security
programme to special circumstances, subject to an appropriate review by the
Commission in order to ensure that such measures do not extend beyond what is
necessary and proportionate to address such circumstances.
(9)  The effective and uniform implementation of security measures requires the setting up
at national level of appropriate quality control systems and the organisation of a
collective peer review under the authority of the Commission, so as to verify the
effectiveness of each national system.
(10)  In accordance with Article 2 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying
down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the
Commission, measures for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted
by use of the procedures provided for in Articles 3 or 5 of that Decision, as the case
may be.
(11)  In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in
Article 5 of the Treaty, the objectives of the proposed action, namely the establishment
and uniform application of common rules in the field of aviation security, cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
European-wide scope of this Regulation, be better achieved by the Community. This
Regulation confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve those
objectives and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Objectives
1. The main objective of this regulation is to ensure a high level of security by taking
action to preventacts of unlawful interference against civil aviation.
2.  Additional objectives are:
(a) to facilitate the free movement of goods and persons through the uniform
enforcement of common standards;
(b) to provide a basis for a uniform implementation of the related provisions of the
Chicago Convention, by ensuring that the provisions of its Annex 17 are duly
taken into account in this Regulation and the measures taken for its application.
3. The means of achieving the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be:10
(a) the setting of common standards on security measures at airports and of technical
specifications for equipment in support of aviation security;
(b) the setting up of appropriate compliance monitoring mechanisms.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purpose of this regulation:
(a) “Air navigation facility” shall mean a physical unit which is used to provide
services necessary to facilitate air navigation, such as air traffic management,
meteorology, telecommunication.
(b) “Airport” shall mean any area in a Member State which is open for commercial
air transport operations.
(c) ‘Chicago Convention’ shall mean the Convention on International Civil Aviation
and its annexes, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944;
(d) ‘security’ shall mean the combination of measures and human and natural
resources intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful
interference.
Article 3
Scope
The measures prescribed by this regulation shall apply to any airport and other air navigation
facilities, located in the territory of the Member States.
Article 4
Common standards
1. The common standards on security measures at airports and the technical specifications
for equipment in support of aviation security are laid down in the annex.
2. The necessary measures for the implementation and the technical adaptation of the
common standards and the technical specifications referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
adopted following the procedure laid down in Article 8(3), giving due consideration to
the various types of operation.
Article 5
National security programme for civil aviation
1. Each Member State shall adopt a national security programme in order to ensure the
application of the common standards referred to in Article 4(1) and the measures
adopted in accordance with article 4(2) by the date specified in these measures.
2. Each Member States shall designate a competent authority responsible for the co-
ordination and the monitoring of the implementation of the security programme.11
Article 6
More stringent measures
Member States may apply more stringent measures than those laid down in this regulation. In
such a case they shall notify to the Commission and the other Member States the nature of
these measures and the reasons therefore. If the Commission considers that these measures are
discriminatory or unnecessarily restrictive and are not justified by the particular
circumstances, it may decide, following the procedures laid down in article 8(2), that the
measures shall be withdrawn.
Article 7
Compliance monitoring
1. The specifications for the quality control system to be implemented by the Member
States shall be adopted following the procedure laid down in Article 8(3). Such system
shall be based on best practices and allow for the swift detection and correction of
failures.
2. The Commission shall conduct, in co-operation with the competent authorities,
inspections to monitor the application by Member States of the provisions of this
Regulation. The procedures for conducting such inspections shall be adopted in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 8(3).
3. The officials mandated by the Commission to conduct inspections in accordance with
paragraph 2 above shall exercise their powers upon production of an authorisation in
writing specifying the subject-matter, the purpose of the inspection and the date on
which it is to begin. In good time before the inspection, the Commission shall inform
the Member State concerned of the inspection and of the identity of the authorised
officials. The Member State concerned shall submit to such inspections and shall ensure
that bodies or persons concerned also submit to inspections.
4. The inspections reports shall be communicated by the Commission to the concerned
Member State which shall within three months of notification indicate the measures
taken to remedy any eventual shortcoming. The report and the answer of the competent
authority shall be communicated to the Committee instituted by Article 8(1).
5. The inspections reports and the answer of the Member States shall be confidential.
Article 8
Committee
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of representatives of the
Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, the advisory procedure laid down in Article
3 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply in compliance with Article 7 and Article 8
thereof.12
3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, the regulatory procedure laid down in
Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply in compliance with Article 7 and Article
8 thereof. .
4. The period provided for in Article 5 (6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be one month
Article 9
Publication of information
The Commission shall publish each year a report on the implementation of this regulation and
on the situation in the Community as far as aviation security is concerned, drawing
conclusions from the inspection reports
Article 10
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Brussels,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President13
ANNEX
Common standards for security measures and
technical specifications of equipment in support of aviation security
1.  SECURITY MEASURES AT AIRPORTS
1.1 Airport planning requirements
The design or layout of airports, passenger terminals, cargo terminals and other airport
buildings having direct access to the airside shall take into account the essential requirements
related to:
a) security measures for passengers including hand baggage, check-in baggage and its
identification;
b) security measures for cargo, express parcels, mail and supplies;
c) the protection of and controlled access to:
i) sterile terminal areas,
ii) separate terminal areas for the check-up and boarding of high-risk passengers,
iii) the airside, and
iv) other specific sensitive areas and facilities; and
d) the efficient use of security equipment.
1.2 Control of access to airside, other restricted areas of airports and aircraft
1.2.1 Boundaries between landside and airside
Boundaries shall be established between landside and airside areas.  Passages through such
boundaries shall be protected by guarded gates and/or locked or guarded doors which shall be
inspected at irregular intervals.
1.2.2 Terminal areas
Surveillance shall be maintained over all terminal areas accessible to the public.  Terminals
shall be patrolled, and passengers and other persons kept under surveillance by security
personnel.  Air carriers shall be required and assisted to exercise control over areas allocated
to them on landside and over their passengers on airside.
1.2.3 Other public areas
The means of controlling access to public areas which are close to aircraft movement areas
(spectator terraces, airport hotels and car parks) shall be provided.  Arrangements shall also be
made to ensure that such public areas may be closed at short notice in the event of an increase
in threat.  Security guards shall patrol these areas when open to the public.14
1.2.4 Access control to airside
1.2.4.1 Access to airside and other restricted areas shall be controlled at all times in order to
ensure that no unauthorised person can access to these areas and that no object which can be
used to commit an act of unlawful interference can be introduced into an aircraft. An
indicative list of such objects is given in Attachment A.
1.2.4.2 At any airport where the number of employees precludes immediate personal
recognition of all staff, identity cards shall be issued to all personnel working in the airport or
visiting it frequently (including airport and air carrier employees and employees of other
organizations).  The identity card shall carry a photograph of the bearer and an indication - by
means of colour-coding or otherwise - of the areas of the airport to which the bearer is entitled
to have access.  It shall be encased in a transparent, tamper-proof cover and be capable of
being worn as a badge.  It shall be valid for a limited period only.  Security checking before
issue is desirable, but in any case employers shall be advised to make appropriate
employment checks before engaging personnel.
1.2.4.3 The identity card shall be worn in a visible place, at all times.
1.2.4.4 The airport management shall issue passes for vehicles requiring to move between
landside and airside.  The pass shall be specific to the vehicle and fixed to it in an easily
visible place.  Other vehicles requiring access to airside shall be admitted only after having
been inspected and issued with a temporary pass.  Only vehicles on emergency missions may
be exempted from these requirements.
1.2.4.5 Identity cards and vehicle passes shall be checked at all access points to the airside,
either visually by security personnel or electronically by an automatic system which shall be
at least as effective.
1.2.4.6 Vehicles and supplies to be conveyed into the airside or other restricted areas shall be
inspected on a selective basis.
1.2.5 Additional security measures on aprons and for other restricted areas
1.2.5.1 There shall be frequent patrols of the apron, other operational areas, the perimeter
fence and adjacent areas outside this fence, including those in the immediate vicinity of
runway threshold and taxiways, with variations in timing, routes and procedures.
1.2.5.2 Aprons and other parking areas shall be adequately lit, and the lighting shall include
specially vulnerable sections of the airport perimeter.
1.2.5.3 Technical and maintenance areas shall be protected by fencing, guards, patrols and the
control of access by means of identity cards and vehicle passes.  Similar measures shall be
taken to protect the perimeter and such installations as power supplies, electrical sub-stations,
control towers and other buildings used by the air traffic services, and fuel and
communications facilities.  Special precautions shall be taken against attempts to sabotage
fuel and communications facilities.
1.2.6 Pre-departure checks and in-transit checks
1.2.6.1 Pre-departure security checks of originating flights shall be implemented to discover
weapons, explosives and sabotage or other dangerous devices which may have been placed on
board.15
1.2.6.2 Appropriate security measures and facilities shall be implemented to ensure that
weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices are not left on board an aircraft at transit
stops by passengers who disembark.
1.2.6.3 Appropriate control systems shall be implemented to identify transit passengers who
disembark and fail to reboard the aircraft at transit stops.  The hand baggage and checked-in
baggage of such transit passengers shall not be transported.
1.2.7 Control of access to parked aircraft
Responsibility shall be established for controlling access to parked aircraft.  When they are
unattended, their doors should be closed and steps removed or airbridges withdrawn.  When
considering how to control access to aircraft, measures provided by airport authorities to
protect the area in which the aircraft is parked may be taken into account (aircraft should
whenever possible be parked away from perimeter fences or other easily penetrable barrier in
well lighted areas).
1.2.8 Security measures for general aviation
1.2.8.1 General aviation aircraft using international airports shall not be parked in the close
vicinity of aircraft which are subject to security programmes to avoid undermining the
provisions of those programmes.
1.2.8.2 Provisions to separate security-screened passengers of scheduled or non-scheduled air
transport flights from occupants of general aviation aircraft shall be implemented, based on
the following principles and methods:
a) at major airports serving scheduled or non-scheduled air transport operations, physical
arrangements and/or security measures shall be introduced to prevent mixing of departing and
arriving occupants of general aviation aircraft with other already security-screened
passengers;
b) if possible, departing and arriving occupants of general aviation aircraft shall pass
through a separate general aviation terminal and, also, when embarking or disembarking on
the apron, shall either be separated from other security-screened passengers, or be transported
in a special bus or car, or be under constant surveillance;
c) if no separate terminal is available, occupants of general aviation aircraft shall either:
i) pass through a separate part of the terminal building and be escorted or transported by
bus/car to and from their aircraft on the apron; or
ii) when passing through sterile areas of the terminal building is unavoidable, be subject
to security screening prior to entering the sterile area; or
iii) be subjected to other security measures achieving the same effect depending on local
circumstances.16
1.3 Security measures related to passengers, baggage, mail and cargo
1.3.1 Security screening for passengers and hand baggage
1.3.1.1 Security screening for passengers
All departing passengers and their hand baggage shall be subject to security screening prior to
departure on international scheduled and non-scheduled air transport flights in order to ensure
that no object which could be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, is carried on
board the aircraft. An indicative list of such objects is provided in attachment A.
1.3.1.2 Search or screening of passengers
Passenger screening may be carried out by hand or by metal detection equipment.  Screening
can take place at the departure gate or can be centralized on entry into a sterile area.
However, centralized searching procedures shall not be applied in terminals where arriving
passengers, who have not been searched on departure in accordance with the essential
requirements contained in this document, would have to enter the same areas as departing
passengers already searched.
1.3.1.3 Separation of screened and unscreened passengers
Security arrangements at airports shall prevent departing passengers mixing with arriving
passengers after the point of security screening.  Where these passengers cannot be separated
physically, and arriving passengers boarded their aircraft at an airport where the security
measures do not meet the essential requirements contained in this document, arriving
passengers shall not be permitted to:
a) mix with screened departing passengers unless they have been subject to appropriate
security screening; or
b) transfer to another flight before being subject to security screening.
1.3.1.4 Security provisions for potentially disruptive passengers
a) Specific security measures shall be introduced for the air transport of the three groups
of potentially disruptive passengers defined below:
i) Deportees
Persons who previously had been legally admitted to a State, or had entered a State illegally,
and who have now been formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave that State.
ii) Inadmissible persons
Persons whose entry to a State is refused by the competent authorities and which is being
transported back to their State of departure, or to any other State where the persons are
admissible.
iii) Persons in lawful custody
Persons either under arrest or convicted by courts of law who have to be transported to
another State for legal reasons.17
b) The competent authorities (police, immigration and/or prison authorities) should
notify the air carrier concerned in sufficient time in writing when they plan to embark
potentially disruptive passengers.  The air carrier concerned has to inform the pilot-in-
command of the respective aircraft accordingly.
c) The written notification to the air carrier and to the pilot-in-command according to
para b) above should contain the following details:
i) identity of the person;
ii)  reason for transportation;
iii)  escort(s), if provided;
iv) risk assessments by the competent authorities;
v) prior seating arrangements, if required; and
vi) nature of available document(s).
d) The supplementary safeguards shall be observed:
i) stringent search of potentially disruptive passengers and their baggage;
ii) boarding prior to all other passengers;
iii) no occupancy of aisle seats or seats next to emergency exits;
iv) no access to alcohol;
v) sufficient number of escorts, if provided;
vi) escorts should be able to converse with the aircraft crew;
vii) no public disclosure of the flight schedule for transporting potentially disruptive
passengers; and
viii) restraining devices have to be provided as required.
1.3.1.5 Hand search or screening of hand baggage
Screening of hand baggage should be carried out by hand or by X-ray equipment.  When X-
ray equipment is used:
a) the operator must satisfy himself that nothing is present of a suspect nature.  If he has
any doubt, the item of baggage must be subjected to a hand search;
b) not less than 10% of baggage screened by X-ray should be searched by hand in a
random manner; and
c) staff shall not be required to scrutinize X-ray images continuously for longer than 20
minutes and shall not resume the scrutiny of X-ray images for a further 40 minutes.18
1.3.2 Handling of checked-in baggage
1.3.2.1 Checked-in baggage shall be protected from interference between the point of check-
in and the aircraft.
1.3.2.2 Without prejudice to para 1.3.7, the following security requirements shall be applied
to all direct flights:
a) Passengers shall be advised that, unless they are declared, electric or electronic items
shall not be placed in their checked-in baggage and that their checked-in baggage may be
subjected to a security check;
b) Passengers shall be warned that if security controls on checked-in baggage reveal the
presence of undeclared electric or electronic items, this baggage might not be transported;
c) Passengers checking in baggage shall be asked to contribute to the security of the
flight by making declarations about the ownership, custody and contents of their baggage, and
in particular, whether their baggage contains electric or electronic items.  Should the results of
the questioning necessitate it, the passenger and his baggage shall be required to undergo a
security check.  The staff involved in such questioning hall be appropriately trained.
d) Checked-in baggage shall be screened by X-ray, other technical means or manually to
determine to the greatest feasible extent that the baggage does not contain an explosive
device.
1.3.2.3 Transfer and transit baggage shall be subjected to the security control measures
specified in paragraph 2 above if they have not been subject to measures at the points of
departure and transit equivalent to those prescribed by these essential requirements. In other
cases, not less than 5% of the on-line and interline transfer baggage should be screened by X-
ray, other technical means or manually.
1.3.3 Identification of checked-in baggage
1.3.3.1 Measures shall be introduced requiring air carriers to:
a) accept and transport checked-in baggage only if it is properly marked externally to
permit identification with the respective passengers;
b) confirm that the passenger to whom the baggage belongs is ticketed for the intended
flight; and
c) ensure that checked-in baggage, prior to being loaded on the aircraft, will be held in an
area of the airport to which only authorized persons may have access.
1.3.3.2 Provision shall be made to ensure that passengers who have checked in their baggage
do subsequently board the aircraft. Baggage which has become separated from its owner shall
only be taken on board an aircraft after it has either been identified by its owner or been
subjected to security control.
1.3.3.3 When in special cases, due to risk assessment or because of exceptional circumstances
at an airport, checked-in baggage is subjected to other security control measures which can
prevent the introduction of weapons or articles likely to be utilized to commit an act of19
unlawful interference, a further reconciliation of boarding passengers with their checked-in
baggage is not required.
1.3.4 Cargo, courier and express parcels and mail
1.3.4.1 Cargo, courier and express parcels
1.3.4.1.1 Application
Cargo, courier and express parcels carried on passenger and all-cargo aircraft shall be
subjected to security controls before being placed on board aircraft.
1.3.4.1.2 Security controls
Security controls shall have for aim to:
a) Ensure that reception, processing and handling of cargo is performed by properly
recruited and trained staff; and
b) Reasonably ensure that the cargo does not contain any prohibited articles as described
in points (iv) and (v) of attachment A by:
i) searching it by hand or physical check; or
ii) screening it by X-ray; or
iii) subjecting it to simulation chamber; or
iv) applying other means, both technical and biosensory (e.g.  sniffers, trace detectors,
dogs, etc.)
Where none of the above means and methods of security screening can be applied due to the
nature of the goods, a 24-hour security storage may be accepted.
1.3.4.1.3 Exemptions
The security controls at para 2 b) above need not be applied in respect of:
- cargo for which an appropriate traceability can be established to ensure that the
objective of para 2 b) here above is met;
- cargo received from a known consignor;
- transhipment cargo, as defined in para 4 hereunder;
- human remains, originating from a recognized source;
- live animals;
- bona fide consignments of life-saving materials;
- high-value goods which have been screened to a standard at least equal to these
essential requirements;
- special nuclear materials.20
1.3.4.1.4 Transhipment cargo
Transhipment cargo arriving by air need not be screened provided that it is protected against
unauthorized interference at the transit point.  Other transhipment cargo, not being submitted
to security controls at the point of departure or en route, shall be screened in accordance with
para 2 b) above and protected from unauthorized interference.
1.3.4.2 Mail
1.3.4.2.1 Application
Mail carried on passenger, all-cargo and all-mail aircraft shall be subjected to security
controls before being placed on board an aircraft.
1.3.4.2.2 Definitions
Mail shall mean dispatches of correspondence and other objects tendered to, and
intended for delivery by a postal authority/administration as defined by Member States.
1.3.4.2.3 Security controls
a) Time-sensitive mail
For time-sensitive mail (i.e. up to 48-hour delivery) the aim of the security controls is
to:
i) ensure that the reception, processing and handling of mail is performed by properly
recruited and trained staff;
ii) reasonably ensure that the mail does not contain any prohibited articles, as listed in
points (iv) and (v) of Attachment A by:
- searching it by hand or physical checks; or
- screening it by X-ray; or
- subjecting it to simulation chamber; or
- applying other means, procedural, technical and biosensory (e.g. sniffers, trace
detectors, dogs, etc.); and
iii) ensure that the flight details and aircraft routing on which the mail is to be carried
remain confidential.
b) Other mail
For mail which is not time-sensitive, the security controls described in para a) ii) above need
only be applied to a random proportion of mail.21
1.3.4.2.4 Exemptions
The security controls at 3 a) ii) above need not be applied in respect of:
- mail for which an appropriate traceability can be established to ensure that the
objectives of para 2 here above are met;
- letters under a specified weight;
- human remains, originating from a recognized source;
- live animals;
- bona fide consignments of life-saving materials;
- high-value goods which have been screened to a level at least equal to these measures;
and
- transhipment mail as defined in para 4 hereunder.
1.3.4.2.5 Transhipment mail
Transhipment mail arriving by air need not be screened provided that it is protected against
unauthorized interference at the transit point.  Other transhipment mail not being submitted to
security controls at the point of departure or en route shall be screened and protected from
unauthorized interference.
1.3.5 Screening of diplomats and other privileged persons
1.3.5.1 Subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
diplomats and other privileged persons and their personal baggage, except "diplomatic bags",
shall be liable to search for security purposes.  Air carrier staff responsible for receiving
diplomatic bags shall make sure that they have, in fact, been sent by duly-appointed officials
of the missions concerned.  Diplomatic couriers and their personal baggage are not exempted
from security screening.
1.3.5.2 Only the following persons may be exempted from normal security screening:
a) Heads of State;
b) official guests invited by the Government; and
c) without prejudice to para 3.1.4, persons duly authorized and accompanied by armed
escorts.
1.3.6 Protection of security checkpoints
Every effort shall be made to properly protect the staff involved in security screening.  Armed
guards should, where practicable, be posted at or patrol in the immediate vicinity of each
security checkpoint in airport terminals.22
1.3.7 Air carrier catering, stores and supplies
1.3.7.1 Application and objective
Measures shall be taken to ensure that air carrier catering, stores and supplies on board
passenger aircraft do not contain any prohibited articles that could endanger the safety of the
aircraft.
1.3.7.2 Security controls
1.3.7.2.1 Suppliers of air carrier catering, cleaning and stores and supplies shall
introduce security measures necessary to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and
other dangerous devices into catering supplies intended for carriage on passenger flights.
At least the following security measures shall be included:
a) The appointment of a security officer responsible for the implementation and
supervision of security in the company;
b) When employing staff, high standards of reliability shall be required;
c) All staff who have access to sterile and/or secured areas shall comply with instructions
issued by the airport authority;
d) The company shall prevent unauthorized access to its facilities;
e) If the company is located outside the airport, ensure that catering supplies are
transported in locked or sealed vehicles; and
f) Ensure that processing and handling of catering supplies are carried out by properly
recruited and trained staff.
1.3.7.2.2 After deliveries of catering supplies, the crew shall check the supplies on a
random basis to ensure that they do not contain any prohibited articles and, if sealed, that
there are no signs of interference.
1.3.7.2.3 Supplies from a company which does not fulfil the security control measures in
para 1 above should not be taken on board an aircraft.
1.4 Security staff
People who are deployed to undertake security duties either as all or part of their employment
shall fulfill the following requirements.
1.4.1 Qualifications of security staff
a) meet specified standards of physical and mental fitness;
b) be subject to pre-employment checks sufficient to ensure they are of good character.23
1.4.2 Training of security staff
a) be subject to initial training before they undertake the duties to which they will be
assigned;
b) undergo regular recurrent training and, as appropriate, conversion training on new
equipment or procedures.
1.4.3 Motivation of security staff
Appropriate measures shall be promoted to ensure that security staff are highly
motivated so as to be effective in the performance of their duties.
1.5 Other staff
Ground Staff Security Training and Awareness
Security training program shall be conducted on initial and recurrent basis for all airport and
air carrier ground staff. The training shall contribute towards raised security awareness as well
as improving the existing security systems. It shall incorporate the following components:
(i) security systems and access control; and
(ii) lines of communications; and
(iii) ground and in-flight security; and
(iv) pre-boarding screening; and
(v) baggage and cargo security; and
(vi) aircraft security and searches; and
(vii) emergency response; and
(viii) weapons and restricted items; and
(ix) monitoring of ground services; and
(x) overview of terrorism; and
(xi) other areas and measures related to security that are considered appropriate to enhance
security awareness.24
2.  TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR EQUIPMENT
Equipment used in support of aviation security shall meet the specifications outlined in this
section.
2.1 METAL DETECTION EQUIPMENT
2.1.1 Walk-through metal detectors
Walk-through metal detectors used in passenger screening at airports shall fulfil the following
requirements:
a) Security
1) Equipment shall be capable of detecting the smallest item of different metals with a
small proportion in favour of ferrous metals in all foreseeable conditions.
2) Equipment shall be capable of detecting metal objects independently of their
orientation and location inside the frame.
3) The sensitivity of the equipment shall be as uniform as possible inside the whole
frame and should remain stable and checked periodically.
b) Operating requirements
The functioning of the equipment shall not be affected by its environment.
c) Alarm indication
Metal detection shall be indicated automatically, leaving nothing to the operator's discretion
(go/no go indicator system):
d) Controls
1) Equipment shall be capable of being adjusted to meet all specified detection
requirements, as well as the volume of the audible alarm.
2) Controls for adjustment of detection levels shall be designed to prevent unauthorized
access.  The settings shall be clearly indicated.
e) Calibration
Calibration procedures shall not be made available to unauthorized persons.
2.1.2 Hand-held metal detectors
Hand-held metal detectors used in passenger screening shall fulfil the following requirements:
a) Equipment shall detect very small quantities of metal without being in direct contact
with the object in all foreseeable conditions.  Sensitivity should enable it to detect 5 g of metal
at 5 cm.
b) Equipment shall detect both ferrous and non-ferrous metals.25
c) The detector coil shall be designed to pinpoint the position of detected metal easily.
d) Equipment shall be fitted with audible and/or visible alarm indicators.
2.2 STANDARDS AND TESTING PROCEDURES FOR X-RAY EQUIPMENT
2.2.1 Applicability
a) Equipment
These requirements and guidelines for X-ray security equipment are applicable to any X-ray-
based screening equipment that provide an image for an operator to interpret.  This includes
conventional X-rays as well as EDS/EDDS used in indicative mode.
b) Items
Similarly, these requirements and guidelines for X-ray security equipment are applicable to
every item being screened, whatever its type or size.
Any item going on board an aircraft, if it has to be screened, has to be screened to the same
standards.
2.2.2 Performance requirements
a) Security
The X-ray equipment shall provide for the necessary detection, measured in terms of
resolution, penetration and discrimination, to forbid that objects as listed in Attachment A, are
carried on board aircraft.
b) Tests
Performance shall be assessed using appropriate test procedures.
c) Operational requirements
The X-ray equipment shall display a complete image of any item fitting into the tunnel.
There shall be no corner cut off.
Distortion of the item displayed shall be kept to a minimum.
The belt of the machine shall be marked to indicate where bags shall be placed on the belt to
obtain optimum images.
Contrast sketching: the X-ray equipment shall have the ability to display groups of grey levels
(scan a smaller range).
The image of any part of the item being screened shall be displayed on the screen for at least 5
seconds.  In addition, the operator shall have the ability to stop the belt and, if necessary,
reverse the belt when further examination is required.
Screen size:  the monitor’s screen shall be sufficient in size for operator’s comfort (typically
14 inches and above).26
Screen characteristics:  the screen shall be flicker-free and have at least 800 lines (typically
1024*1024 pixels, i.e. high-resolution monitors).
Where dual monitors are used, one shall be monochrome only.
The X-ray equipment shall indicate visually materials it cannot penetrate.
The X-ray equipment shall provide organic and inorganic stripping.
The systems shall provide automatic threat recognition to facilitate operator’s search.
d) Maintenance
No unauthorized changes, including maintenance or repair, shall be made.  There shall be no
change in the hardware or the software of the machine without verifying that it does not
adversely affect image performance.
The composition of the belt material shall not be changed without verifying that this induces
no change in image performance.
If modem access for maintenance or upgrades is available, access shall be controlled and
monitored.27
Attachment A
Guidelines for classification of weapons, dangerous goods and restricted items that are
prohibited in the sterile airport areas and aircraft cabins.
These are guidelines of possible shape of weapons and restricted items, common sense should
however prevail in accessing if an object is raising cause to believe that it may be used a
weapon.
(i)Firearms: Any weapon from which a shot may be fired by the force of an explosion or
compressed air, including starter and flare pistols.
(ii)Knives and cutting tools: Including sabers, swords, cardboard cutters, hunting knives,
souvenir knives, martial arts devices, professional tools and such other knives with blades of 6
cm long or longer and/or knives considered illegal by local law.
(iii)Bludgeons: Blackjacks, billy clubs, baseball clubs or similar instruments.
(iv)Explosives/Ammunition /Flammable Liquids/Corrosive: Any explosive or incendiary
components, which by themselves or in conjunction with other items can result in an
explosion or fire. These include explosive materials, blasting caps, fireworks, gasoline, other
flammable liquids, ammunition, etc., or any combination of these items. Any corrosive or
toxic substances, including gases, whether or not under pressure.
(v)Disabling or Incapacitating Items: All tear gas, mace, and similar chemicals and gasses
whether in pistol, canister, or other container, and other disabling devices such as electronic
stunning/shocking devices.
(vi)Other Articles: Such items as ice picks, alpenstocks straight razors, and elongated scissors,
even though not commonly thought of as a deadly or dangerous weapon, but could be used as
a weapon, including toy or “dummy” weapons or grenades.
(vii)Articles of any kind giving rise to reasonable suspicion that an items may be used to
simulate a deadly weapon, such could include but not be limited to: objects resembling
explosive devices or other items that may give appearance of a weapon or dangerous item. “28
LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Policy area: Aviation safety and protection of passengers
Activity: Security
TITLE OF ACTION: REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON
ESTABLISHING COMMON RULES IN THE FIELD OF AVIATION SECURITY
1. BUDGET LINE
The commitment will be charged to heading B2-702 B against the financial year
2002.
2. OVERALL FIGURES
2.1. Total allocation for action (Part B): annual expenditure: 1.215 € million for
commitment
2.2. Period of application:
starting in 2002, ongoing
2.3. Overall multi-annual estimate of expenditure:
(a) Schedule of commitment appropriations/payment appropriations (financial
intervention) (see point 6.1.1)
€ million (to three decimal places)
Year
2002
2003 2004 2005 2006
2007
and
subs.
Years
Total
Commitments 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215
Payments 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215
(b) Technical and administrative assistance and support expenditure
Commitments - - . - - - -
P a y m e n t s ------
Subtotal a+b
Commitments 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 7.290
Payments 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 1.215 7.29029
(c) Overall financial impact of human resources and other administrative expenditure
(see points 7.2 and 7.3)
Commitments/
payments
0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430 2.580
TOTAL a+b+c
Commitments 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 9.870
Payments 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645 9.870
2.4. Compatibility with financial programming and financial perspective
New action
2.5. Financial impact on revenue:
Proposal has no financial implications (involves technical aspects regarding
implementation of a measure)
3. BUDGET CHARACTERISTICS
Type of expenditure New EFTA
contribution
Contributions
form applicant
countries
Heading in
financial
perspective
Comp Differentiated YES NO NO No
4. LEGAL BASIS
Article 80 (2)
5. DESCRIPTION AND GROUNDS
5.1. Need for Community intervention
5.1.1. Objectives pursued
Europe must take urgent action to respond to the terrorist threat. The Council of Transport
Ministers, meeting on 14 September 2001, agreed that all Member States should apply the key
measures recommended by the European Aviation Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) to
ensure aviation security and to examine what complimentary measures might be necessary.
The European Council, meeting in an extraordinary session on 21 September, asked that the
next Council meeting of Transport Ministers, scheduled for 15 October 2001, take the
necessary measures to strengthen aviation security. These measures cover, in particular, the
following items:
Classification of armaments.30
Technical training of crews.
Control and monitoring of hold baggage.
Control of access to the cockpit.
Quality control of security measures applied by Member States.
It also required that the effective and uniform implementation of security measures be ensured
by means, in particular, of reciprocal controls (“peer review”), to be established without
delay.
The Community, after examination of these orientations, decided that the best way forward
was to propose legislation covering these various points.
The final actions on the above list, described as “Quality control of security measures applied
by Member States” and the peer review, involve direct action by the Commission and,
accordingly will impact financially upon its budget. This action is, therefore, the subject of
this document. The figures set out here are based on the assumption that the Commission will
bear the full cost; however, it may be possible that a cost-sharing arrangement with Member
States be established.
To fulfil these tasks the Commission proposes to establish a Security Audit Office which will
be staffed as follows:
Manager
Security Expert
Administrator
Secretary
The Audit Office will employ the services of 2 teams of security auditors each composed of 4
members. Audits will be conducted annually in each Member State, including sample audits
at airports. It is anticipated that each team will audit 40 airports per year which, ECAC has
stated, is sufficient to evaluate the state of implementation of the common security measures
and to detail possible weaknesses..
5.1.2. Measures taken in connection with ex ante evaluation
This involves:
(a) The Commission together with the Council presidency organised on 25 September a
meeting with the main stakeholders to which the proposed initiatives were presented
and discussed. The action covered by the present financial statement are based on the
work prepared by the relevant international organisations (ECAC and ICAO)
 (b) The Commission-proposed course of action was accepted as a suitable response to
the threat.
5.2. Action envisaged and budget intervention arrangements
The beneficiaries of the proposed actions will be the European flying public, the 387 airports
they use and the 15 national authorities which are responsible for their security. The objective
of this proposal is to increase and standardise the security arrangements at European airports.31
5.3. Methods of implementation
Direct management by the Commission using regular and outside staff.
6. FINANCIAL IMPACT
6.1. Total financial impact on Part B - (over the entire programming period)
6.1.1. Technical and administrative assistance, support expenditure and IT expenditure
(commitment appropriations)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
and
subs.
years
Total
1) Technical and
administrative assistance
-------
a) Technical assistance
offices
-------
b) Other technical and
administrative assistance:
- intra m euros:
- extra m euros:
of which for construction
and maintenance of
computerised management
systems
-------
S u b t o t a l  1 -------
2) Support expenditure -------
a) Training -------
b )  M e e t i n g s  o f  e x p e r t s -------
c) Information and
publications
-------
S u b t o t a l  2 -------
TOTAL -------
6.2 Calculation of costs by measure envisaged in Part B (over the entire programming
period
The cost per year to hire 8 auditors is estimated to be 8 x 150 000 EUR = 1 200 000 EUR.
This annual cost is unlikely to vary over the period shown in the table.
Training costs are calculated as follows:32
Assistant Security Expert – Familiarisation Training 3 days @ EUR 500/day = EUR  1 500
Security Expert
Plus
8xAuditors - European Standardisation Training = 9 x 3 days @ EUR 500/day = EUR 13 500
Total annual training costs are therefore EUR 15 000.
The training cost estimates include accommodation and since the individual auditors will
change according to circumstances in the provider states and the Assistant Security Expert
will require annual updating, it is assumed that the training requirement will remain roughly
the same each year throughout the period.
7. IMPACT ON STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
7.1. Impact on human resources
Staff to be assigned to management of the
action using existing and/or additional
resources
Description of tasks deriving from the
action
Types of post
Number of
permanent posts
Number of
temporary posts
Total
Officials or
temporary staff
A
B
C
1
1
1
1
1
1
Security expert
Administrator
Secretary
Other human resources 1 DNE (security expert)
T o t a l 314
„In the estimate of human and administrative resources required for the action, DG/Services
must take into account the decisions taken by the Commission in its orientation debate and
when adopting the preliminary draft budget (PDB).  This means that DGs must show that
human resources can be covered by the indicative pre-allocation made when the PDB was
adopted.
Exceptional cases, where the action concerned could not be foreseen when the PDB was
being prepared, will have to be referred to the Commission for a decision on whether and how
(by means of an amendment of the indicative pre-allocation, an ad hoc redeployment exercise,
a supplementary/amending budget or a letter of amendment to the draft budget)
implementation of the proposed action can be accepted.“
7.2. Overall financial impact of human resources
Type of human resources Amount (€) Method of calculation *33
Officials
Temporary staff
324 000 Average cost of Commission officials,
including overheads – from D4 BUDG
Other human resources
(specify budget line)
  42 000 DNE
Total 366 000
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.
„In the estimate of human and administrative resources required for the action, DG/Services
must take into account the decisions taken by the Commission in its orientation debate and
when adopting the preliminary draft budget (PDB).  This means that DGs must show that
human resources can be covered by the indicative pre-allocation made when the PDB was
adopted.
Exceptional cases, where the action concerned could not be foreseen when the PDB was
being prepared, will have to be referred to the Commission for a decision on whether and how
(by means of an amendment of the indicative pre-allocation, an ad hoc redeployment exercise,
a supplementary/amending budget or a letter of amendment to the draft budget)
implementation of the proposed action can be accepted.“34
7.3. Other administrative expenditure deriving from the action
Budget line
(number and heading)
Amount € Method of calculation
Overall allocation (Title A7)
A0701 – Missions
A07030 – Meetings
A07031 – Compulsory committees
A07032 – Non-compulsory committees
A07040 – Conferences
A0705 – Studies and consultations
Other expenditure (specify)
64000 80 airport inspections per year at 800 €
Information systems (A-5001/A-4300)
Other expenditure - Part A (specify)
Total 64000
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months.
The needs for human and administrative resources shall be covered within the allocation
granted to the managing DG
I. Annual total (7.2 + 7.3)
II. Duration of action
III. Total cost of action (I x II)
€ 430 000
indefinite
€ 430 000
8. FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION
8.1. Follow-up arrangements
Follow-up audits will be conducted
8.2. Arrangements and schedule for the planned evaluation
The Commission Audit Office will liaise with national authorities seeking their co-operation
to remedy deficiencies
9. ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES
The Commission Audit Office will be subject to the normal Commission audit regimes.35
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON BUSINESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES( SMEs)
TITLE OF PROPOSAL
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing
common rules in the field of civil aviation security
DOCUMENT REFERENCE NUMBER
COM(2001)575
THE PROPOSAL
1. Taking account of the principle of subsidiarity, why is Community legislation
necessary in this area and what are its main aims? – Recent events precipitated the
need for a tightening of aviation security. This must be achieved by establishing
common rules and ensuring their uniform application through appropriate
monitoring and inspection.
THE IMPACT ON BUSINESS
2. Who will be affected by the proposal?
–  which sectors of business – airlines and airports
–  which sizes of business (what is the concentration of small and medium-sized
firms) – all sizes of airline/airport undertakings
–  are there particular geographical areas of the Community where these businesses
are found - no
3. What will business have to do to comply with the proposal? – Develop procedures
and make relatively modest investment in equipment. It is likely that additional staff
will be required; it is however not known whether such surcharge shall be beared by
the industry or by Member States themselves.
4. What economic effects is the proposal likely to have?
–  on employment – some jobs will be created.
–  on investment and the creation of new businesses – security specialist firms may
expand.
–  on the competitiveness of businesses – nil since all will be subject to the same
measures.36
5. Does the proposal contain measures to take account of the specific situation of small
and medium-sized firms (reduced or different requirements etc)? – not directly, but
since the stringency of the security measures shall take into account the
circumstance of each type of operation, it is likely that the impact on small aircraft
(and therefore on small companies) will be lighter.
CONSULTATION
6. List the organisations which have been consulted about the proposal and outline their
main views.
The Airport Council International, the Association of European Airlines, the
European Regional Airlines Association, the International Air Carriers Association,
the European Transport Federation and the European Cockpit Association are being
involved in the process. They all support the establishment of common rules and of a
collective review for their effective and uniform application. In the current situation
it is vital for the industry as a whole to restore confidence and convince the public to
continue travelling by air.